Robert Simpson, in Aeon, proposes a new way of understanding/adjudicating free speech:
…put free ‘speech’ as such to one side, and replace it with a series of more narrowly targeted expressive liberties. Rather than locating actions such as protest and whistleblowing under the umbrella of ‘free speech’, we could formulate specially tailored norms, such as a principle of free public protest, or a principle of protected whistleblowing. The idea would be to explicitly nominate the particular species of communication that we want to defend, instead of just pointing to the overarching genus of ‘free speech’. This way the battle wouldn’t be fought out over the boundaries of what qualifies as speech, but instead, more directly, over the kinds of communicative activities we think need special protection.
I think the problem with categorizing speech is you open the door to attaching different values to each of the categories. Maybe we come to believe that categories a and b are very sacred, while categories x, y and z are somewhat less sacred. However that gets parsed, you’ve lost the notion of free speech being sacred as such.
Who cares? Maybe no one. But I’d argue that in making that move you’ve eliminated two very important, and intertwined, concepts behind the First Amendment: 1) there’s no way to know how speech will be framed or deployed in the future, and 2) courts and regulatory bodies have an important role to play in determining which actions are justified by constitutional amendments (the First being just one of them). Once you subdivide speech I fear you undermine the ability of ‘free speech’ to adapt to changing norms and methods of communication.
Also, it’s not clear to me that this proposal is about First Amendment jurisprudence as opposed to a legislative — or conceptual — reevaluation of the First Amendment. When Simpson says things like “Instead of throwing out free speech entirely…” or “replace [free speech] with a series of more narrowly targeted expressive liberties” or “Any time a country is creating or revising a bill of rights,” my mind goes to constitutional theory rather than jurisprudential history, especially given the lack of court precedent cited in the article.
If we’re talking about how judges should interpret the First Amendment as it’s written, then I think we need to have some categories, doctrine, etc. The problem is that there are always going to be new cases that come before the courts that entice or compel judges to create a new category (like ‘corporate personhood’), thereby revising — or discarding — the doctrine.
This goes back to my point about the methods of speech constantly changing, which I think makes the effort to interpret the First via some finite set of categories seem a little stuck in the present, unless you believe that Citizens United (and cases that followed) was a judicial overreach by a momentarily corporatist court (just one example from recent times). If you don’t think that, then I think you need some rationale for when/why/how it’s okay to create new categories out of thin air once you’ve committed to a framework of judging by existing doctrinal categories.